By Gretchen Garrity
Just a small tidbit—an amuse
bouche if you will--of what can happen when administrative staff
are given authority by the governing body in a seemingly
insignificant sentence of a legal contract. In 2017, when Ken
Barthelette, a former president of the Christian County Library Board
of Trustees signed off on the new board attorney’s contract, it
contained the following sentence:
“If Mr. Styron
feels that he is being asked to perform services outside the scope of
the $500 flat fee, he will promptly notify the Library Director and
work with the Director [to] establish a budget for the additional
services.”
The board attorney
does not represent the library’s executive director, but the board
of trustees. They are the client of the board attorney. The board of
trustees has the authority on behalf of the taxpayers to incur legal
expenses on behalf of the Library District.

It was the former
president of the board of trustees that signed the contract, not the
executive director. Another small, but significant instance when an
unelected administrative agent was given authority that belonged to
the citizens via their publicly appointed representatives.
How did it come
about that a previous board agreed to give the executive director the
authority to be a primary contact for the board attorney, and to
determine additional fees and budgeting? There is nothing to suggest
that the board of trustees is included in the consulting and
decision-making between the attorney and the executive director. The
board of trustees are listed as a party to the contract along
with the law firm, however.
The executive
director is in charge of day-to-day
operations, which is generally defined as “...happening every
day as a regular part of your job.” These vary, of course,
according to the organization and position.
As the client of the
board attorney, the board of trustees is ultimately responsible for
consulting with and directing their attorney regarding legal matters,
including establishing a budget and being asked to perform services
outside the scope of his/her retainer fee.
Missouri statute
(182.070)
states, “The county library district, as a body corporate, by
and through the county library board of trustees, may sue and be
sued, complain and defend…”
How did it come
about that the former board attorney, without the vote of the “body
corporate, by and through the county library board of trustees,”
sued his own client?
By whose authority
was this done? The latest filing in the lawsuit, “Defendants’
Answer and Affirmative Defenses,” states, “Plaintiffs’
Petition
is barred,
excused, or diminished by the equitable doctrine of unclean hands
for
numerous reasons
including
that this action was filed on behalf
of
the District without a proper meeting and without authority.
In
addition, Count III was dismissed
on
behalf of the District without a proper
meeting
and without
authority.”
Trustee
Janis Hagen has positioned herself as a private citizen who claims she is suing
the three board members as individuals, and not as the “body
corporate.” Indeed,
she maintains that she is doing so out of a personal disagreement
with the other board members that has nothing to do with the library!
The final invoice shared by Mr. Styron, who is Hagen’s attorney
in the case, noted that Hagen was paying half the amount of the
invoice. She is willing for the taxpayer to pay for half the lawsuit
that was initiated, while the other “plaintiff,” the Library
District, was added without a proper meeting or authority.
 |
Click on image for clarity
|
According
to the attorney’s contract the authority to authorize “services
outside the scope of the flat fee” fell to the executive
director. Did the former executive director work with the
board attorney and trustee Hagen to establish a budget for the lawsuit against the three board members?
Small things matter
in big ways sometimes.